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Comment
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission: A Court Divided-One
Opinion Properly Subjects Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence to a Reality Check
Lisa Gordon*
In January 1986, Democratic Congressman Timothy Wirth
announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate.' Before Wirth se-
cured the Democratic Party's nomination, a series of negative
campaign advertisements directed at Wirth flooded the radio.2
The advertisements accused him of misrepresenting his stand on
balanced budget and defense spending issues.3 Although the
Republican nominee had yet to be determined, the Colorado Re-
publican Federal Campaign Committee (CRFCC) paid for the
advertisements.4 The Democratic party filed a complaint with
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), alleging that the
CRFCC advertisement "was an 'expenditure in connection with'
a candidate for federal office in violation of the spending limits
set out in [Federal Election Campaign Act] § 441a(d)(3)."5 The
FEC filed suit alleging that the CRFCC failed to report the ex-
penditure made on the Wirth advertisements, thereby violating
FECA's party expenditure provision.6 The CRFCC responded by
claiming the FECA provisions violated the First Amendment.7
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1994,
University of California, Davis.
1. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996).
2. Id. at 1018.
3. Id. at 1018 n.1. The Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Com-
mission spent $15,000 on radio advertisements directed at Mr. Wirth. Id. at
1018.
4 Id.
5. Id. The Federal Election Campaign Act is referred to as FECA, 2
U.S.C. § 441a (1994).
6. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1018. The
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The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado held
that the provision did not cover the advertisement because the
advertisement did not expressly advocate a particular candi-
date, and granted summary judgment for the CRFCC. 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
finding that the provision encompassed more than just a politi-
cal party's express advocacy and that the provision was consti-
tutional as applied.' The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the FECA provisions violated the First
Amendment because they restricted a political party's ability to
make independent expenditures."l There was no majority
opinion, and the plurality opinion's differing approaches leave
lower courts with no direction on the type of analysis to per-
form when analyzing campaign finance legislation."I
FECA political party provision restricts the amount political parties can spend
during a federal election. Id. at 1018-19.
7. Id. at 1018. The CRFCC alleged that the FECA restrictions were un-
constitutional as applied to political party independent expenditures, and also
alleged that the entire FECA political party provision was unconstitutional.
Id. at 1023-24.
8. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.
1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). The district court found the statute
inapplicable because the expenditure was not made "in connection with" a po-
litical campaign. Id. at 1456-57.
9. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d at 1023-24. The
court of appeals found that "political parties are considered incapable of
making independent expenditures." Id. at 1019. Consequently, the court's
analysis centered on whether the expenditure in question was coordinated.
Id. at 1021. Determining that FECA's phrase "in connection with" was not
entirely clear, the court looked to the FEC's interpretation. Id. The court
found reasonable the agency's interpretation that "in connection with" was not
limited to express advocacy for a clearly identified candidate. Id. at 1022.
Rejecting the facial challenge to FECA's restrictions on political parties,
the court found that the government interest in preventing corruption justi-
fied the First Amendment restrictions of FECA on political parties. Id. at
1023-24. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis, see generally Geof-
frey M. Wardle, Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to Regulating the
Contributions and Expenditures of Political Parties: Federal Election Com-
mission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 46 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 603 (1996).
10. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2314-21 (1996) [hereinafter CRFCC]. The Supreme
Court remanded the facial challenge to the FECA political party provision.
Id. at 2321. Four members of the Court would have decided the facial chal-
lenge. Id. at 2321-25.
11. Seven members of the Court supported the judgment, with Justice
Stevens and Justice Ginsberg dissenting. Id. at 2331. Justice Breyer wrote
for the Court, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas each issued an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 2312-31.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Commentators have found campaign finance reform one of
the "most fundamental issues facing the nation." 2 As special
interests increasingly dominate the political landscape with
their infusions of capital, 3 the demand for reform has become
urgent and widespread.' 4 Before Congress acts, however, it
needs to consider the constitutional limits on campaign finance
reform. Although the plurality opinions in CRFCC paid hom-
age to Buckley v. Valeo, 5 the seminal campaign finance reform
case, the fractured Court gave Congress little insight on the
continuing importance of a Buckley-type analysis.
This Comment contends that Justice Kennedy's contextual
approach in CRFCC is preferable to Justice Breyer's categori-
cal approach for evaluating limitations on campaign finance
legislation. Part I briefly discusses the history of the Supreme
Court's treatment of campaign finance legislation. Part II de-
scribes the CRFCC Court's decision and the various types of
reasoning advanced by the pluralities. Part I argues that
Justice Breyer's three-Justice plurality opinion misconstrues
recent precedent and represents a categorical approach to
campaign finance analysis that is incompatible with political
reality. Part III also contends that Justice Kennedy's three-
Justice concurrence, advancing a contextual approach, is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's recent campaign finance
analysis. Part HI then argues that the Court's categorical
Buckley approach to campaign finance regulation was so re-
moved from the realities of the American electoral system that
it unnecessarily thwarted legislative efforts to reform cam-
paign financing. This Comment concludes that the Court
should continue to move from a categorical to a contextual
12. See, e.g., Anthony C. Beilenson, Perspective on Government; Time Is
Right to Solve Key Issues; Washington Has Prime Opportunity to Balance the
Budget, Reform Campaign Financing and Curb Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1997, at B17 (stating that campaign finance reform is one of three funda-
mental issues today).
13. See, e.g., Hottest Issue of the Campaign; Political Funding: Money
From Special Interests Reaches Obscene Levels, Spurs Reform, BALTIMORE
SUN, Nov. 3, 1996, at 2F (citing the 1996 election as the "most heavily fi-
nanced election ... in history"); The Color of Money in the Fight for Control of
Congress, Interest Groups Are Betting Millions, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP.,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 24-25 (examining the enormous sums contributed by interest
groups in 1996).
14. Cf. Molly Ivins, On voter turnout, the Jones indexes and campaign fi-
nance reform, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 3, 1996, at 13A (noting that the
one clear mandate from the 1996 election is campaign finance reform).
15.. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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analysis of campaign finance issues, and that lower courts
should base future decisions on Justice Kennedy's approach.
I. HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Campaign finance reform is one of the most explosive and
pressing issues facing America. 16 Despite the public's demand
for reform, partisan standoff has generally monopolized and
handicapped recent congressional attempts to reform the cam-
paign system. 7 The First Amendment places further limits on
congressional action. 8 Taken together, political and constitu-
tional demands have transformed campaign finance jurispru-
dence into a quagmire of rules and exceptions.
A. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AND AMENDMENTS
In the early part of the twentieth century, Congress passed
its first federal campaign finance legislation. 9 These laws
were largely unsuccessful at curbing outrageous campaign
practices.2" In 1971, new legislation signified a renewed com-
16. See Michael Barone, Doing Sisyphus's Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 25, 1996, at 46 ("The cry is on for campaign finance reform."); Mary
Beth Regan, Campaign Finance: A Deepening Cesspool of Politics and Cash,
BUS. WEEK, July 22, 1996, at 36 (noting that campaign finance reform may be
a major issue in the 1996 presidential election).
17. See Chuck Alston, A Wide Gulf Still Separates Parties on Election
Laws, 48 CONG. Q. WELY. REP. 517, 517-19 (1990) (finding that even when the
climate is right for campaign finance reform, the congressional debate re-
mains partisan, with each party attempting to protect their sources of financ-
ing); see also Geoffrey M. Wardle, Political Contributions and Conduits after
Charles Keating and EMILY's List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming
Federal Campaign Finance, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 548 (1996)
("Although the Democrats of the House and Senate agreed about the need for
campaign finance reform, they quickly diverged in their approaches to re-
form.").
18. See generally Eliza Newlin Carney, Defending PACs, NAT'L J., July
11, 1996, at 1518 (noting that banning PAC money implicates constitutional
principles); see also The Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995: Hear-
ings on S.1219 Before the Comm. on Rules of the United States Senate, 105
Cong. 325 (1996) (statement of Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School) (discussing First Amendment implications).
19. See Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1994)) (regulating labor unions); Hatch Act of 1940,
54 Stat. 767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.) (imposing contribution limits); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C.
§ 256, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (requiring disclosure of expenditures and contri-
butions) (repealed 1972); Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (prohibiting
corporations from making contributions to federal election campaigns).
20. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL
[Vol. 81:15651568
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mitment to meaningful campaign finance reform. Congress
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), re-
quiring greater disclosure of political campaign contributions, 21
and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971,
providing for public financing of presidential elections and tax
incentives for political contributions.22 The aftermath of the
Watergate scandal illustrated the enormous deficiencies that
remained in the campaign finance system.23
In 1974, Congress responded with amendments to FECA
that profoundly expanded regulation of federal election cam-
paigns.24  First, the amendments imposed contribution limits
on individuals 25 and multicandidate political committees.26
They also limited the amount individuals could independently
spend on an identifiable candidate .2  The amendments re-
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER A DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 13 (1981)
(noting that the Acts were riddled with loopholes and were largely ineffec-
tive). One reason for the laws' ineffectiveness was that they only applied to
selected organizations, such as corporations and labor unions, and only tar-
geted certain elections. Id. at 14-15. The narrow scope of the laws also en-
couraged circumvention of the legislation, and persistent lack of enforcement
further contributed to the problem. Id. at 13-14.
21. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C, and 47
U.S.C. (1994)).
22. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-
9013 (1994).
23. The Watergate scandal revealed illegal contributions to President
Nixon's 1972 campaign. STEPHEN A. SALMORE & BARBARA G. SALMORE,
CANDIDATES, PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGNS: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 49
(1985). Some of the illegal contributions made to the Nixon campaign were
used to fund the Watergate break-in. Clarissa Long, Shouting Down the Voice
of the People: Political Parties, Powerful PACs, and Concerns About Corrup-
tion, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65 (1994); see also Debra Burke, Twenty
Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look
Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 360 (1995) (noting that Watergate
produced demands for reform); David M. Neidert, Campaign Reform: Fifteen
Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 289, 291 (1991) (noting that
"the Watergate scandal served as the catalyst for the profound changes in our
electoral system").
24. Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
(1994)).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)-(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)-(3) (1994)) (imposing a $1,000 contribution limit with re-
spect to any candidate for federal office and an aggregate limit of $25,000 per
calendar year).
26. Id. § 608(b)(1)-(3) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)-(3) (1994))
(limiting political committees, except for principle campaign committees, to a
$5,000 contribution limit per individual federal candidate).
27. Id. § 608(e) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1994)) (restricting
1997] 1569
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stricted the amount a candidate and his family could person-
ally spend on a campaign,28 and capped the total amount a
candidate could spend on a political campaign.29 FECA also
imposed reporting and disclosing requirements on political
committees.3" The Act created FEC to enforce the provisions. 31
Finally, FECA restricted the amount a political party could
spend and contribute to candidates for federal office. 32
B. THE BUCKLEY DECISION
United States Senator James Buckley filed suit in federal
court challenging FECA's constitutionality under the First
Amendment.33 Unlike prior cases, in which the Supreme Court
had intentionally avoided addressing the constitutional ques-
tions surrounding campaign finance legislation,34 the Court's
per curiam decision in Buckley v. Valeo35 was detailed. Buckley
laid the foundation for campaign finance reform analysis by
articulating the constitutional parameters.
The Court found that the crux of political campaigns is
protected First Amendment expression. 36 In light of the de-
pendence on money to promulgate political speech, the Court
held that money equals political expression.37 Consequently,
spending restrictions necessarily implicate the First Amend-
ment.38
the amount an individual can spend relative to an identified candidate during
a calendar year to $10,000).
28. Id. § 608(a)(1) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994)) (limiting the
amount a federal candidate or his family can personally spend in a calendar
year for a nomination for election or an election, depending upon the federal
office being sought).
29. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A)-(E) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994)).
30. 14 U.S.C. §§ 432-34 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 434 (1994)).
31. Id. § 437 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1994)).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a (1994)).
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 110
(1948) (declining to express an opinion as to the constitutionality of a section
of the Labor Management Act of 1947, which forbids labor organizations from
making contributions and expenditures in connection with a federal election
campaign).
35. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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Because FECA restricted individual and candidate First
Amendment rights of political expression39 and association,4
the Supreme Court used a strict standard of review.41 The
Court held that the only compelling government interest was
preserving the integrity of the electoral system.42 The Court
characterized this interest as "preventing corruption or the ap-
pearance thereof' due to large contributions given in exchange
for political favors.43 It summarily rejected the government's
other asserted interests in equalizing "the relative ability of all
citizens to affect the outcome of elections," and curbing the sky-
rocketing costs of political campaigns to open the political sys-
tem up to less affluent persons. 4
The Court separately examined contribution45 and inde-
pendent expenditure limitations,46 and found that expenditure
39. The Court stated that '[a] restriction on the amount of money a per-
son or group can spend on political communication during a campaign neces-
sarily reduces the quantity of expression... because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money." Id.
40. Since contributions to and expenditures on a candidate serve to iden-
tify people with that candidate, and enable people to pool their resources to
further a particular goal, the FECA restrictions on contributions and expendi-
tures directly impacted the First Amendment right to freedom of association.
Id. at 23.
41. Although the Court never explicitly identified the level of review used
to assess the FECA amendments, it stated that limitations on First Amend-
ment rights are subject to "exacting scrutiny." Id. at 44-45. The Court has
subsequently stated that government restrictions directed at speech restric-
tions must be narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling interest. First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); see also Michael J. Garrison,
Corporate Political Speech, Campaign Spending, and First Amendment Doc-
trine, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 163, 174 & n.69 (1989) (noting that "the Court implic-
itly adopt[ed] the 'compelling state interese test"). But see Patrick Mulligan,
Unlimited PACCESS to the Political Process: First Amendment Protection of
Independent Expenditures by Political Action Committees, 57 U. COLO. L. REV.
759, 760 (1986) (noting that "the Court has applied varying standards of judi-
cial review to congressional regulation of campaign spending").
42. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
43. Id. The Court termed this "quid pro quo" corruption. Id. Since can-
didates depend on campaign contributions, there is a risk that the integrity of
the political system may be compromised if "large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders." Id.
The Court considered equally important the negative impact that the appear-
ance of corruption could have on the political system by eroding the public's
confidence. Id. at 27.
44. Id. at 48-49. The Court stated that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id.
45. The term contribution means any contribution made directly or indi-
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limitations invaded primary areas of First Amendment values. 7
The Court then determined that independent expenditures were
primary speech because they involved direct, individual expres-
sion.48  Thus, any restrictions aimed at such communication
"represented substantial... restraints on the quality and diver-
sity of political speech."49 Observing that the lack of coordina-
tion between the speaker and the candidate inherent in inde-
pendent expenditures negated the government's asserted
interest in preventing corruption, the Court found the relation-
ship between the government's interest and the restriction
tenuous.5 ° Since the restriction severely infringed on First
Amendment rights without serving a compelling governmental
interest, the Court held the restriction unconstitutional."
In contrast, the Court found that contributions were an
indirect form of communication because they involved speech
by someone other than the contributor.52 Due to the indirect
nature of contributions, the Court found that they deserved
less First Amendment protection than direct speech. 3 Since
contribution limitations do not infringe on an individual's abil-
ity to engage in direct speech, the Court noted, the law imposes
only marginal restrictions on freedom of expression and asso-
rectly to a candidate, political party, political action committee, or campaign
committee. It includes expenditures made in cooperation, in coordination, or
with the consent of a candidate or his agent. Federal Election Campaign Act,
2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (1994).
46. The term independent expenditure means any expenditure made by
an individual or other entity without the cooperation, authorization, coordi-
nation, or consent of the candidate or his agent. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 37.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 19-20.
49. Id. at 19. The Court found that the expenditure limitations severely
curtailed speech because they prevented everyone except political parties and
political action committees from expressing their views about a candidate that
cost in excess of $1,000. Id. at 19-20.
50. Id. at 44-47. The Court found that "independent expenditures... may
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of
an expenditure with the candidate... undermines the value of the expendi-
ture... [and] alleviates the danger that expenditure will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id. at 47.
51. Id. at 51. By striking down the independent expenditure restrictions
and the restrictions on personal spending, the Court invalidated FECA's re-
strictions capping total costs of political campaigns. Id. at 51, 58.
52. Id. at 20-21. When a person contributes money to a candidate, it is
the candidate, not the donor, that engages in direct political speech. Id. at 21.
The donor's communication is indirect because the candidate essentially




ciation 4 The Court further found the contribution limitations
justified as narrowly tailored means to remedy the corruption
problems associated with large political contributions.
55 Ac-
cordingly, the Court found limitations on campaign contribu-
tions constitutional.
Justice White illustrated in his dissent in Buckley that the
majority's categorical approach focused on election theory
rather than reality.56 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, found
Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures
illusory.57 Still other scholars disagreed with Buckley's prem-
ise that money equals speech,58 and argued that the Court too
54. Id. at 51-52. Specifically, the Court reasoned, "A contribution serves
as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does
not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of com-
munication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of
his contribution." Id.
55. Id. at 28-29. The court noted that the contribution limitation of the
Act targeted "the problem of large campaign contributions ... while leaving
persons free to engage in independent political expression." Id. at 28.
56. Specifically, Justice White contended that the Court should defer to
Congress's judgment, because Congress better understood the realities of po-
litical campaigns. Id. at 260-61 (White, J., dissenting); see J. Skelly Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 611 (1982) (arguing that the
Court's lack of experience and understanding of political campaigns led to its
faulty assertion that money necessarily equals political speech).
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 287 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Addressing fed-
eral campaign practices, the Committee on House Administration observed
that "the large sums of money spent in congressional elections have created
an appearance of corruption damaging to public confidence in the electoral
process." H.R. REP. No. 340, at 8 (1991). Voters now believe that lobbyists
control Congress and that election outcomes are determined by money, not
voters. Id.
Whether independent expenditures are truly "independent" is a recurring
issue. People running "independent" campaigns can run them "in tandem"
with candidates even without formal consultation. Richard Briffault, The
Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
2083, 2092 (1984) (book review). Candidates and committees can retain the
same pollsters and media consultants, and can use the same mailing lists. Id.
Even without such "indirect" coordination, independent committees can read
newspapers and newsletters, and thereby learn "the candidate's campaign
strategy, themes.., and apply their independent dollars accordingly." Id. at
2092-93; see also FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 121-53
(1988) (discussing the role of political party money in congressional elections).
58. See Mulligan, supra note 41, at 767 (observing that the Supreme
Court in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), based its "money equals speech" assertion on a
faulty and outdated notion of "unegalitarian economic philosophy of free mar-
ket idealism"). See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:
Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (questioning whether money is
15731997]
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readily dismissed as uncompelling the government's asserted
interest in political equality.59 Despite the overwhelming dis-
appointment generated by the Buckley decision, the Supreme
Court continued to invoke Buckley's principles when assessing
government efforts to regulate campaign financing.60
Although the Buckley Court specifically acknowledged that
Congress enacted FECA to make the government responsive to
the needs of the majority and dispel the view that elected offi-
cials are beholden to special interests, 61 the Buckley decision
ultimately thwarted Congress's original purpose, and forced
Congress to redraft FECA.62 Congressional action in response
to Buckley weakened restrictions on campaign spending.63 In
sum, the Buckley holding has severely curtailed congressional
attempts to reform campaign financing.
C. BUCKLEY'S PROGENY
In the twenty years following Buckley, the Supreme Court
further delineated the constitutional parameters of campaign
finance legislation. The Court's First Amendment analysis has
focused primarily on three factors: the type of election, the type
of speech restriction, and the form of the regulated entity. The
Court examines the type of election at issue to assess the le-
gitimacy of the government interest.' In determining the type
of speech restriction, the Court determines whether the legis-
lation restricts contributions or expenditures to measure the
truly equivalent to pure speech for constitutional purposes, and arguing that
campaign contributions and spending are speech-related conduct).
59. See Wright, supra note 56, at 642 (contending that "equality is part of
the central meaning of the first amendment and underlies each of its most
important purposes").
60. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (tracing the Court's sub-
sequent application of Buckley).
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26.
62. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
63. Responding to concerns over FECA's effects on a political party's abil-
ity to engage in grass roots party building, Congress amended FECA in 1979
and exempted party "building" activities from the FECA spending limits(termed soft money). Id. § 431(8)(B)(x), (xii), (9)(B)(viii), (ix). Another method
used to circumvent FECA is called "bundling." For an extensive discussion on
"bundling" and other types of third-party fundraising see Wardle, supra note
17, at 549-58.
64- See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Coures
approach to noncandidate elections).
[Vol. 81:15651574
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extent of First Amendment infringement.65 Finally, the Court
evaluates the form of the regulated entity to determine the im-
pact of the speech restriction and whether the restriction is
narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest.6 6 This
three-factor approach has restricted the legislature's ability to
impose effective campaign finance reforms.
67
1. Nonpartisan Elections
Buckley did not squarely address the issue of corporate
speech in noncandidate elections. Shortly after Buckley, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Bellotti
6
held unconstitutional a law prohibiting corporations from
making contributions and independent expenditures in refer-
enda elections.69 The Court found corporate speech valuable
"in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas."70 While recognizing a
long standing government interest in preventing undue influ-
ence from corporate funds as compelling,71 the Court rejected
this interest as a justification for restrictions in noncandidate
elections.7 2 Instead, the Court focused on the inherent differ-
65. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (addressing the Court's
differing treatment of contribution limitations and independent expenditure
restrictions).
66. See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
treatment of nonprofit ideological corporations).
67. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 41, at 764-65 (noting that the Court
based its decision in a related case on a "series of misconceptions" and
"theoretical" notions that ignore the reality of the electoral system); Wright,
supra note 56, at 636 (arguing that the Supreme Court has misused the First
Amendment in campaign finance cases by "invok[ing] the first amendment,
not to protect diversity, but to prevent society from defending itself against
the stifling influence of money in politics").
68. First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
69. Id. at 795.
70. Id. at 783. The Court found the source of communication unimportant
and rejected the argument that corporate speech deserved less protection
than citizen speech. Id. at 777.
71. Id. at 788-89.
72. Id. at 789-90. By rejecting the corporate corruption doctrine in non-
candidate elections, the Court modified its prior treatment of corporate politi-
cal activity. See United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75
(1957) (recognizing the dangers of union and corporate speech in the electoral
process, and refusing to strike down congressional efforts. to restrict such
speech).
The Court rejected the notion that corporate speech should be suppressed
because it might influence individual voters. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790. While
the Court found no evidence that corporations actually monopolized or unduly
15751997]
1576 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1565
ence between candidate and referenda elections, finding that
when there were no candidates to bribe, the potential for cor-
ruption did not exist. 3 The Court struck down the statute be-
cause the government's interest could not justify the infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights.74
Although the Court indicated that it would reconsider Bel-
lotti's holding if the government empirically demonstrated the
negative effects of corporate speech, 5 it subsequently refused
to do so in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley.7 6
In that case, the Court found unconstitutional an ordinance
that limited contributions to political committees established
to support or oppose noncandidate elections.77 Despite empiri-
cal evidence demonstrating the influence of such committees in
noncandidate elections n7 the Court struck down the ordi-
influenced the referenda in Bellotti, Justice Wright (the D.C. Circuit judge
whose opinion the Supreme Court partially reversed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)) has found otherwise. See Wright, supra note 56, at
623 (noting that "massive spending and sophisticated media campaigns by
special interest groups have swamped referenda that were initially favored by
a majority of the voters"). According to Wright, not only does corporate
spending almost always win, but it also "distort[s] the expressed will of the
people by the sheer inequality of financial resources and the avalanche of
campaign messages." Id. at 625. He proffers that corporate spending drowns
out opponents, thereby "squeez[ing] out" the individual and defeating "the
very purpose of direct democracy." Id. Finally, Wright believes that corpo-
rate spending has led to disillusioned and apathetic voters, and further
threatens to jeopardize "the integrity of our electoral process and the essence
of our political faith." Id.
73. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90. Many legal commentators have disagreed
with the Court's holding. Although in ballot elections corporations cannot ac-
tually exert power over a candidate, they can, by virtue of their enormous
wealth, spend money communicating their message to the public. David R.
Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the Initia-
tive Process, 61 BROOK L. REV. 1347, 1378-83 (1995). Since they can out-
spend virtually all other interested parties, corporations can exert tremen-
dous power over voters, id. at 1396, a practice no less corrupt than the quid
pro quo arrangement condemned in Buckley. Lagasse notes many instances
in which corporations spending 10 times more than initiative proponents have
successfully defeated overwhelmingly popular ballot initiatives. Id. at 1347-
48.
74. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791. One arguable effect of Bellotti has been ac-
tive corporate involvement in politics, which has resulted in "financial domi-
nance by ,corporations in direct forms of democracy." Garrison, supra note 41,
at 163.
75. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792.
76. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
77. Id. at 300.
78. In Citizens Against Rent Control, the government produced evidence
that special interest committees, supported in large part by corporations, had
a tremendous impact on the electoral process. Id. at 307 nn.2-3 (White, J.,
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nance.7 9 Relying on Bellotti, the Court held that corporate in-
fluence in noncandidate elections in the form of special interest
groups did not constitute corruption, and therefore did not jus-
tify restricting the First Amendment rights of association and
free speech.80
2. Contributions vs. Independent Expenditures
Under Buckley, the Court allows legislatures to impose
contribution limitations." The Court has determined that con-
tributions are an indirect form of political communication, such
that restrictions impose only a marginal infringement on First
Amendment rights. 82 In contrast, the Court generally strikes
down restrictions on independent expenditures. For example,
in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Po-
litical Action Committee (National Conservative PAC),3 the
Court examined whether the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act (Fund Act)84 violated the First Amendment by impos-
ing a $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures when a
presidential candidate accepted federal funding.15  Although
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice White argued, "Large contributions,
mainly from corporate sources, have skyrocketed as the role of individuals has
declined. Staggering disparities have developed between spending for and
against various ballot measures." Id. at 307 (citations omitted). Justice
White also observed that, unlike in Bellotti, the issue in Citizens Against Rent
Control was a contribution limit, not an expenditure limit, and under Buckley,
a contribution limitation is generally constitutional because it represents only
a marginal speech infringement. Id. at 304-05; see also infra notes 81-90 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between contribution and ex-
penditure restrictions).
79. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299.
80. Id. Since Bellotti and Citizens Against Rent Control, studies have
found that corporate spending "threatens the foundation of the democratic
system." Lagasse, supra note 73, at 1378. While corporate spending is not
always determinative, it does have a substantial impact on election outcomes,
especially when corporations oppose a ballot measure. Daniel H. Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 511 (1982).
8L Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20, 28-29 (1976) (per curiam).
82. California Med. Assoc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194-
99 (1981).
83. 470 U.S. 480 (1985) [hereinafter National Conservative PAC].
84. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1994).
85. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 495-98. By allowing PACs to
make independent expenditures after a candidate accepts federal funds, the
Court's decision directly overturned a congressional attempt to limit PAC in-
fluence and instead revived the need for candidates to solicit PACs for sup-
port. Mulligan, supra note 41, at 768-69. Because of the enormous influence
that PACs wield, candidates are more likely to be persuaded by influential
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the Court recognized that political action committees (PACs)
spend substantial sums to exert influence, it rejected the gov-
ernment's contention that PACs should have diminished First
Amendment rights. 86 The Court reasoned that the collective
pooling of citizen resources to amplify a message was entitled
to full First Amendment protection.87 It found that restrictions
PACs than individual voters. Id. at 769. Additionally, "[s]ince the only ave-
nue of political expression realistically open to the less affluent individual is
the vote, allowing massive PAC expenditures to directly and powerfully influ-
ence candidates serves to diminish the value of a single individual's vote." Id.
Consequently, PACs have become a very powerful part of the electoral process
at the expense of the individual voter, thereby jeopardizing the integrity of
the democratic process. Id.
The National Conservative PAC decision also gave PACs a monetary ad-
vantage in the campaign system as compared to political parties. Id. at 770.
PACs have no spending limit under FECA and can make independent expen-
ditures even after a candidate accepts public financing. Id. Political parties
are capped in the amount they can contribute to candidates. While PACs and
political parties have "surface similarities," political parties are "unique insti-
tutions" distinguishable from PACs. JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND
ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 14-15 (1987). Whereas PACs represent narrow inter-
ests, political parties "take stands on the whole spectrum of issues with which
government deals." Id. at 15. Additionally, while PACs overwhelmingly rep-
resent corporate, business, and special interest groups, political parties repre-
sent diverse interests. Mulligan, supra note 41, at 770. Interest groups are
primarily concerned with government policy, whereas parties are chiefly con-
cerned with winning elections and therefore show "flexibility in... their pol-
icy positions and willingness to accommodate a wide variety of different
views." BIBBY, supra, at 16. Unlike PACs, political parties are "open, inclu-
sive, and semi-public political organization[s] composed of [their] own clien-
tele." Id. at 17. Political parties "can help assure that groups without finan-
cial access to candidates ... are not shut out of the system... [and] provide a
means by which the vast majority of people can gain both political identity
and political leverage." Long, supra note 23, at 1176.
86. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 494. The Court also refused
to equate PACs with corporations. Id. at 495-96.
87. Id. at 495. The Court ignored the realities of PACs in the American
electoral system. Mulligan, supra note 41, at 764. The structure and focus of
PACs resemble corporations rather than grass roots organizations. Id. at 761.
PACs are highly bureaucratic and centralized, with the PAC leadership con-
trolling the PAC money and receiving access to candidates. Id. at 765-66.
While PACs are open to everyone, they are not representative of the general
population. Id. at 764-65. "Statistics tend to show a concentration of PACs
and PAC growth in particularly well-represented business fields, with the
majority of the populace left unrepresented." Id. at 765. PAC expenditures
"often take the form of highly concentrated lobbying efforts on a certain nar-
row issue, with only a few interested businesses, corporations, or influential
individuals committed to a position on the issue-quite contrary to the Court's
vision of widespread populist organization." Id. at 761. PACs maintain
"disproportionate power ... by virtue of the sums of money they command
and the single issue that unites their members." Long, supra note 23, at 1178.
Because of the amount of PAC money available in campaigns, elected officials
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on independent expenditures represented a substantial in-
fringement on First Amendment rights.88 Relying on Buckley,
the Court deemed the government interest in preventing cor-
ruption insufficient,8 9 noting that a lack of coordination with a
candidate undermines an expenditure's value and mitigates
the risk of corruption.
90
3. Corporate Form
Initially, the Supreme Court approached corporate speech
in candidate elections without evaluating the type of corpora-
tion involved.91 In 1986, however, the Supreme Court aban-
doned this inflexible analysis. Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life92 (Citizens for Life) distin-
guished nonprofit ideological corporations from for-profit cor-
porations in campaign finance restriction evaluations.93 The
case centered on whether the FECA amendment requiring cor-
porations to keep a separate political fund was unconstitu-
are influenced and "[tailor] their speech and actions to please particular PACs
rather than representing the broader interest of their electorate." Id. Finally,
the Court failed to note that corporations can form PACs, thereby circumvent-
ing FECA. The skyrocketing number of corporate PACs illustrates the reali-
zation of this concern. BIBBY, supra note 85, at 214.
88. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 494. The Court also noted
that a fundamental distinction exists between contribution and expenditure
restrictions. Id. at 497.
89. Id. at 496-97.
90. Id. at 497. In the case of PACs, however, "[i]t seems quite fanciful to
believe that these expenditures will go unnoticed by candidates, and hence
will not exert any corrupting influence, or that these expenditures are totally
uncoordinated since often candidates and committees share political consult-
ants." Burke, supra note 23, at 369.
91. In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee,
459 U.S. 197 (1982) [hereinafter Right to Work Committee], the Court did not
distinguish between nonprofit and for-profit corporations when interpreting
FECA. Id. at 209-10. Instead, the Court considered Right to Work Committee
a contribution case and upheld the restriction. The Court embraced the gov-
ernment interest in restricting corporate spending because "corporations have
immense financial resources [and] .. .the corporate form is given state-
created advantages which facilitate the formation of capital... thus [giving]
corporations an unfair advantage." Garrison, supra note 41, at 192. This rea-
soning contradicts Bellotti. Moreover, the Court did not explain why it failed
to consider the type of corporation at issue in Right to Work Committee. If the
evil was the massive capital amassed by virtue of state conferred benefits, it is
difficult to see how this applies to nonprofits. An important aspect of Right to
Work Committee is that the Court relegitimized the government's corporate
corruption interest. See id. at 207-08.
92. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) [hereinafter Citizens for Life].
93. Id. at 259.
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tional as applied to a nonprofit ideological corporation.94 The
Court found that the FECA restrictions on corporations could
dissuade some organizations from engaging in political
speech.95
The Court evaluated the restriction's imposition on First
Amendment rights in light of the government's compelling in-
terest in restricting a corporation's ability to use wealth to im-
properly influence the electoral system.96 The Court reasoned
that the potential for corporate wealth corruption did not exist
because the ideological nonprofit corporation "was formed to
disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital."97 Since the
government interest did not apply to a nonprofit organization
and the regulation imposed substantial obstacles to the organi-
zation's ability to exercise First Amendment rights, the Court
held the FECA provision unconstitutional as applied.98 The
Court also established a three-prong test for determining when
a corporation may be exempt from FECA.99 Under this test,
the Court evaluates the purpose of the organization, the rela-
94. Id. at 241. In Citizens for Life, a nonprofit corporation spent over
$9,000 from its general treasury fund to send out a special newsletter identi-
fying candidates who were for and against abortion. Id. at 243-44.
95. Id. at 254. The Court observed that these requirements impose sub-
stantial administrative costs that small organizations may not be able to af-
ford. Id.
96. Id. at 259. The government justified the separate fund requirement
as necessary to ensure that "competition among actors in the political arena is
truly competition among ideas" and not monetary prowess. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 263. Despite rejecting the government's interest as it applied to
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court, in dicta, upheld this interest as
compelling. Id. at 263-64. By embracing the notion that "quid pro quo" cor-
ruption is not the only type of corruption that can justify a government re-
striction, id. at 260, the Court departed from Buckley.
The same analysis the Court used in rejecting the government's corrup-
tion interest as applied to a nonprofit ideological corporation could apply to
political parties. Political party contributions to candidates are not typically
viewed as corrupt and do not constitute the "quid pro quo" corruption that
justifies FECA's speech restrictions. Long, supra note 23, at 1187-88. Be-
cause political parties have long-term interests and goals, they have an in-
centive to prevent corruption in order to minimize the risk of losing political
power. Id. When a party contributes money to its candidate (even a candi-
date with different views), it is considered "party qua party influence." Id. at
1188-89. The Supreme Court has not considered such behavior corruption,
and such party influence over candidates "performs the positive social func-
tion of labeling a candidate for voters." Id. at 1189.
99. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264. In essence, the Court found Con-
gress's regulation not narrowly tailored in certain contexts. Id. at 265.
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tionship of persons affiliated with the organization, and the
entity that established the organization.
00
The Supreme Court subsequently applied this test to a
nonprofit organization engaging in both political and non-
political activities. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce,101 a corporation contended that a state law similar to
FECA was unconstitutional as applied.'12 After evaluating the
chamber of commerce under the three-prong test,0 3 the Court
found the corporation distinguishable from the nonprofit in
Citizens for Life, and therefore subject to the statute's require-
ments.10 4 Given the compelling government interests, the leg-
islature could properly regulate the corporation because the re-
strictions were narrowly tailored to further the government's
interest.05
In Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court adopted the
definition of corruption outlined in Citizens for Life10 6 and rec-
ognized that political corruption was not limited to the
"financial quid pro quo" arrangement. Instead, political cor-
ruption included the distorting effects of corporate wealth on
the electoral process when amassed by virtue of state-conferred
benefits. 07 The Court held that a restriction guaranteeing that
100. Id. at 264.
101. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
102. Id. at 656. The provisions of the Michigan statute were very similar
to FECA's requirements. Id. at 656 n.1.
103. See id. at 661-65 (outlining and applying the three-prong test estab-
lished in Citizens for Life).
104. Id. at 662-65. Specifically, the Court found that the corporation failed
the first prong by engaging in nonpolitical activities. Id. at 662-63. Addi-
tionally, while the corporation did not have shareholders, many of its mem-
bers would be reluctant to withdraw because of the benefits of associating
with the corporation. Id. Finally, the corporation was not independent of
business corporations because "more than three-quarters of the Chamber's
members are business corporations." Id. at 664.
105. Id. at 668-69. The Court emphasized that the restriction did not ab-
solutely deny corporations the ability to engage in political speech, but merely
imposed a regulation on how a corporation may engage in such speech. Id. at
660.
106. Id. at 659.
107. Id. at 659-60. After Buckley, the Court's holdings did not squarely
address this issue. While the Court embraced a similar interest in Right to
Work Committee, the Court considered that a contribution case. See supra
note 91 and accompanying text (discussing Right to Work Committee, which
upheld restrictions on corporate contributions). Despite discussing this gov-
ernment interest in Citizens for Life, the Court ultimately found the interest
inapplicable. See Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986) (noting that
the Court's discussion was dicta). Thus, Michigan Chamber of Commerce was
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"expenditures reflect actual public support for the political
ideas espoused by corporations" served a compelling govern-
ment interest.l1
II. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission (CRFCC),1°9 the Supreme Court
held that the FECA provisions prohibiting political parties
from making independent expenditures violated the First
Amendment. 110 While consistent with the Supreme Court's
general prohibition on independent expenditure limitations,"'
the Court's seven to two decision contained no majority opin-
ion. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court, but only two Justices,
the same number of Justices that supported concurring opin-
ions by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, joined him."2
A. JUSTICE BREYER'S APPLICATION OF THE BUCKLEY
FRAMEWORK TO POLITICAL PARTIES
Justice Breyer used Buckley's categorical analysis to exam-
ine FECA's political party restrictions."' His opinion centered
on the notion that political parties are essentially no different
the first post-Buckley case in which the Court explicitly held that "[c]orporate
wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of in-
dependent expenditures... [and is] a sufficiently compelling rationale to sup-
port [the state's] restriction." Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at
660.
108. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 660.
109. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
110. Id. at 2312.
111. See supra notes 46-51, 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing inde-
pendent expenditures).
112. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2310. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined
Justice Breyer's opinion. Id. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined his opinion. Id. at 2321. Justice Thomas fied an opinion con-
curring in the judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, in which he sought to overrule Buckley. Id. at
2323. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsberg joined.
Id. at 2332.
113. Id. at 2312. Justice Breyer noted that FECA case law, dominated by
the Buckley decision, should control the Court's analysis of CRFCC. Id. He
observed that Buckley adopted a distinction between independent expendi-
tures and contributions. Id. at 2313. He also explained that expenditures
made in coordination with a candidate are considered contributions and there-
fore can be regulated. Id.
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than other entities and should be afforded the same constitu-
tional rights."4 Labeling the money spent on the Wirth ad-
vertisement an independent expenditure, l" 5 he found this
type of donation to fall well within fundamental First
Amendment protection under Buckley." 6 He reasoned that a
political party's independent expenditure is a core First
Amendment activity, equally as important to free political ex-
pression as similar expressive activity by other entities. 17
Thus, because of its First Amendment implications, the FECA
restriction had to serve a compelling state interest to be consti-
tutional."'
Justice Breyer determined that no special danger of cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption existed with relation
to political parties."9 The prevention of corruption, therefore,
could not justify substantial speech restrictions. 20 Although
Justice Breyer recognized that political parties are entitled to
certain benefits not offered to other entities,'12' he found that
the benefits did not provide a greater opportunity for corrup-
tion or circumvention of other FECA provisions. 22 Support-
ing this contention, he observed that the FECA party provi-
sions are not based on fears of corruption, but rather are
114. Id. at 2315-16.
115. Id. at 2315. Justice Breyer accepted the fundamental difference be-
tween contributions and expenditures as outlined in Buckley. Id. While con-
tribution restrictions only marginally limit speech, independent expenditure
restrictions significantly impair political speech. Id. Additionally, restrictions
on contributions serve the compelling state interest of preventing corruption
or the appearance thereof. Id. Conversely, restrictions on independent ex-
penditures do not directly serve the government's interest. Id. at 2315-16.
116. Id.
117. Id. Justice Breyer noted that a party's expression "reflects its mem-
bers' views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them
together, [and] it also seeks to convince others to join those members in a
practical democratic task." Id.
118. See id. at 2315-17 (discussing whether the government's interest in
preventing political corruption is compelling enough to outweigh a political
party's First Amendment right to make contributions).
119. Id. at 2316-17.
120. Id. Justice Breyer reiterated that, under Buckley, the only justifica-
tion for FECA's speech restrictions is to remedy the appearance or reality of
corruption. Id. at 2315.
121. Id. at 2316. Under FECA, political parties have a higher limit on co-
ordinated expenditures and can receive unregulated "soft money." Id.
122. Id. Since there is no prearrangement with the candidates, Justice




based on Congress's desire to reduce excessive campaign
spending, 123 an interest the Court found uncompelling in
Buckley.12
4
Justice Breyer rejected the FEC's presumption that politi-
cal party expenditures are always coordinated.'25 Instead, he
found that political parties could make independent expendi-
tures and that the FEC Advisory Opinions suggested that po-
litical parties did make independent expenditures.1 26  Justice
Breyer remanded the broader issue of regulating a political
party's coordinated expenditure. 27
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S REJECTION OF A STRICT BUCKLEY
ANALYSIS
The Kennedy opinion endorsed the Breyer opinion with re-
gard to its reasoning and its conclusion that the FEC violated
the Constitution by presuming that political parties could not
make independent expenditures. 28 Instead of relying solely on
Buckley's categories, however, Justice Kennedy's opinion offered
an evaluation of the characteristics and functions of political
parties in the context of free political expression, and focused on
the rationale behind the constitutionality of contribution and ex-
penditure limitations. 29
Justice Kennedy first determined that Buckley's categori-
cal framework did not expressly address political parties and
123. Id. at 2317. Justice Breyer found that the legislative history undercut
the FEC's unsupported assertions regarding political parties and corruption.
Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (per curiam)).
124. See id. (refusing to deny political parties the constitutional right to
make individual expenditures).
125. Id. at 2318-19.
126. Id. The FEC failed to provide any empirical or experience-based evi-
dence showing that all party expenditures are coordinated with a candidate.
Id. at 2318.
127. Id. at 2321.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2322-23. Justice Kennedy focused on the reason behind the
Buckley Court's holding that contributions are "less like 'speech' for First
Amendment purposes." Id. at 2322. Justice Kennedy discussed Buckley's
reasoning that contributions provide a rough indicator of an individual's sup-
port for a candidate, and noted that the amount an individual can contribute
has only a marginal effect on political expression. Id. Since contributions
pass from the individual to the candidate, they involve speech by someone
other than the contributor. Id.
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should not automatically be applied to political parties.130
Finding that Buckley's categorical distinctions were based on
static assumptions about the effect speech restrictions have on
individuals and candidates,"' Justice Kennedy refused to re-
sort to Buckley's labels to determine whether the speech re-
striction on political parties was constitutional.'32
Instead, Justice Kennedy independently examined the na-
ture and function of political parties to determine whether the
speech restriction was narrowly tailored. He found that politi-
cal parties play a vital role in promoting First Amendment
values by selecting candidates to espouse their principles and
beliefs.'33 Noting the important and unique functions of politi-
cal parties in advancing free speech, he emphasized that, un-
like other entities, political parties rely on candidates to convey
their message. 3 4 He concluded that FECA's restriction posed
an overarching constitutional problem because it substantially
stifled a political party's ability to engage in free political ex-
pression.'35 Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that political par-
ties are indistinguishable from their candidates, and ques-
tioned whether Congress could constitutionally regulate party
spending during an election. 3
6
III. A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH: THE BETTER OPTION
Despite its seven to two decision, the Court's splintered
opinions in CRFCC leave lower courts without clear guidance
for analyzing campaign finance restrictions. Future courts
should reject Justice Breyer's categorical approach. His analysis
misapplies Buckley and ignores recent Court precedent. By re-
turning the Court to a rigid, categorical method of evaluation,
Justice Breyer's approach would unnecessarily hamper future
campaign finance reform. Although neither the Breyer opinion
130. Id. In Justice Kennedy's view, "we should not transplant the reason-
ing of cases upholding ordinary contribution limitations to a case involving




134. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that parties are most effective when they
are able to publicize their views by "selecting and supporting candidates." Id.
135. Id. at 2323. Justice Kennedy concluded that "tt]he party's speech...
cannot be separated from speech on the candidate's behalf without constraining





nor the Kennedy opinion are binding precedent, courts should
adopt Justice Kennedy's contextual approach. Justice Ken-
nedy correctly followed recent Court precedent in holding
Buckley's premises inapplicable to political parties, and as-
sessed the unique characteristics of political party speech in
candidate elections. Despite an inadequate examination of the
governmental interest, Justice Kennedy proffered a support-
able analysis that will positively impact the future of campaign
finance jurisprudence by assessing campaign finance reform in
accordance with political reality.
Although the Supreme Court initially adopted a categori-
cal approach to campaign finance issues, similar to the ap-
proach in Justice Breyer's opinion, the Court has more recently
used a contextual analysis. The categorical approach ignores
political realities and undercuts Congress's ability to enact
comprehensive campaign finance reform. Conversely, Justice
Kennedy's contextual approach narrowly tailors First Amend-
ment analysis to the regulated parties and elections. This ap-
proach more accurately reflects political realities without sac-
rificing valid constitutional protection.
A. SHORTCOMINGS OF JUSTICE BREYER'S APPROACH
Justice Breyer's decision avoids flexible analysis in favor of
applying existing and often inapplicable Court principles. His
analysis fails to consider that prior Court cases arose in con-
texts quite different from political party speech.'37 Ultimately,
the major flaw in Justice Breyer's opinion is that he ignored re-
cent Court precedent and discounted the importance of examin-
ing context rather than adhering blindly to Buckley categories.
1. Justice Breyer Incorrectly Applied Buckley
Justice Breyer automatically employed Buckley's categori-
cal framework without determining whether this framework
applied to the issues in CRFCC.138 Although Buckley is the
seminal case addressing campaign finance reform and still con-
tains valid principles of First Amendment election law, it did
137. Prior to CRFCC, the Supreme Court had not examined FECA restric-
tions on political parties. While the campaign finance cases are relevant con-
stitutional jurisprudence, they do not raise many of the unique issues pertain-
ing to political parties. See supra notes 85, 98 (examining the unique
characteristics of political parties).
138. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2312.
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not address FECA's political party expenditure provision. 13 9
Buckley dealt only with individuals and candidates. Addi-
tionally, the Buckley Court premised its observations and rea-
soning on assumptions about the behavior of individuals and
candidates, not political parties.140 Political parties' behavior
differs from that of other entities because their survival is de-
pendent upon uniting diverse interests.14' Because they rely
on candidates to achieve political success, political parties are
ultimately responsible to the public for their candidates' ac-
tions." Justice Breyer failed to consider whether Buckley
applied to CRFCC. While a review of Buckley's basic principles
may assist in conducting a First Amendment analysis, Justice
Breyer's decision to automatically extend Buckley's categorical
framework to political parties misconstrued Buckley's prece-
dential significance.
Using Buckley's assumptions about individuals and candi-
dates to measure the speech restriction on political parties,
Justice Breyer did not explore the actual impact of FECA's re-
strictions on a political party's First Amendment rights. Re-
cently, to accurately assess whether a speech restriction is nar-
rowly tailored, the Court has examined the magnitude of the
speech restriction by evaluating the form of the regulated en-
tity.143 Because a political party's sole reason for existence is to
engage in political speech, constraints on a political party's po-
litical expression constitutes substantial government in-
fringement. 14 Thus, using the Buckley framework without a
139. Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976) (per curiam).
140. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-52 (noting the constitutional difference be-
tween contribution and expenditure limitations based on their effect on peo-
ple's ability to communicate political messages).
14. See supra note 85 (highlighting the unique features that distinguish
political parties from other entities).
142. See supra note 85 (discussing political party responsibility and goals).
While he aptly noted the importance of political parties in the United States,
Justice Breyer proceeded to treat political parties just like individuals or
candidates. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2312. This Comment does not argue that
political parties deserve or have elevated First Amendment rights, but rather
that parties function differently than other entities. Because they serve a
unique function as compared to individuals, candidates, or PACs, political
parties are affected differently by restrictions and implicate different consti-
tutional concerns. Thus, restrictions on political parties should be individu-
ally assessed to understand the type, amount, and necessity of a First
Amendment restriction.
143. See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text (discussing the FECA
regulations as they apply to different types of corporate entities).
144. See CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (noting that FECA stifles "the ability
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thorough, independent assessment of political parties, Justice
Breyer failed to make a true assessment of First Amendment in-
terests.
2. Justice Breyer Failed to Examine Whether the Restriction
Was Narrowly Tailored to Achieve the Government's
Interest
Justice Breyer accepted the government's interest in pro-
tecting the electoral system from "the appearance of corrup-
tion" without assessing the interest's pertinence to the behav-
ior of political parties.'45 First Amendment analysis requires a
speech restriction to achieve a "compelling governmental inter-
est."'46 Although Justice Breyer found that the government's
interest was certainly compelling in the abstract, he failed to
examine whether restricting a political party's speech actually
served the government's interest. While the government has a
justifiable interest in dealing with individuals and PACs, re-
stricting political party expenditures may not necessarily fur-
ther the government's interest in combating electoral corrup-
tion. 47 Whereas special interest money is often viewed as a
corrupting influence, 148 it is generally not construed as corrup-
tion when a political party spends money to support its candi-
dates.1 49 The expected relationship between political parties
and their candidates performs the social function of labeling
candidates for voters. 50 Thus, the nature and function of
American political parties makes the relevance of the govern-
ment corruption interest to political parties questionable.
Even if the government's interest is justified with respect to
of the party to do what it exists to do"); see also supra note 85 (discussing the
function of political parties in America).
145. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2313; see also supra note 98 (discussing political
party contributions and the likelihood that they will be used in government
corruption).
146. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299
(1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
147. See supra note 98 (suggesting that political party corruption is un-
likely).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 340, at 8 (1991) (discussing the public's belief that
the electoral process is governed by money and lobbyists); supra note 13 and
accompanying text (discussing the large amounts of PAC money contributed
to elections).
149. See supra note 98 (examining the relationship between parties and
their candidates).
150. See supra note 98 (discussing the benefits of the relationship between
political party behavior and candidates).
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political parties, Justice Breyer should have at least engaged
in the inquiry. His failure to examine its applicability to politi-
cal parties made his First Amendment analysis incomplete.' 51
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy went beyond a
mechanical application of the Buckley categorical framework
and specifically assessed its applicability to CRFCC.'5 2 Justice
Kennedy's opinion then went further, evaluating the character-
istics of political parties and exploring the ramifications of
FECA provisions on political parties rather than simply label-
ing CRFCC's advertisement money as an independent expendi-
ture and striking down the law. 53 Despite this strong start,
Justice Kennedy inadequately completed his analysis by failing
to examine the government's interest. 5 4
1. Justice Kennedy Followed Recent Precedent
Justice Kennedy's opinion properly determined that the
Buckley framework did not apply to CRFCC 5 5 Justice Ken-
nedy observed that the Court's differential treatment of contri-
butions and independent expenditures in Buckley focused on
the behavior of individuals and candidates, not political par-
ties. 56 He also found that the Court "had no occasion in Buck-
ley to consider possible First Amendment objections to limita-
tions on spending by [political] parties."157 Justice Kennedy
noted that political parties function differently than individu-
als and candidates because parties "exist to advance their
members' shared political beliefs."'58 Thus, Justice Kennedy
aptly concluded that the Court should subject First Amend-
ment restrictions on political parties to an independent contex-
tual analysis, and that Buckley should not control. 59
151. See CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2312, 2315 (1996) (stating the issues of
the case, with no mention of the relevance of the government corruption in-
terest to political parties).
152. Id. at 2321-22.
153. Id. at 2322-23.
154. Id. at 2321-23.




159. Id. at 2322-23.
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Justice Kennedy next correctly evaluated the unique role
political parties play in contributing to public debate.1 60 By
centering his analysis on the regulated entity to ascertain the
effect of the speech restriction, his analysis traced the contex-
tual approach the Court used in Citizens for Life' 6' and Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce.62 Just as the Court explored the
differences between nonprofit corporations and for-profit corpo-
rations in Citizens for Life, 63 Justice Kennedy distinguished
political parties from individuals and candidates. He recog-
nized that political parties have distinct "traditions and prin-
ciples that transcend the interests of individual candidates and
campaigns."" These characteristics enable parties to play a
unique and significant role in debate on public issues.' 65 Con-
sequently, Justice Kennedy properly assessed the speech re-
striction in light of political parties' function in society. 66
Justice Kennedy correctly found that the FECA restric-
tions on political parties represented more than just a mar-
ginal restriction on a political party's expression.1 6 Under
Buckley, Congress can only impose marginal restrictions on
freedom of political expression. 68 Under Justice Kennedy's
approach, political parties receive the same close examination
of their function and First Amendment interests as any other
organization. Although political parties function differently
than candidates, Justice Kennedy appropriately observed that
"candidates are necessary to make the party's message known
160. Id.
161. 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986); see also supra notes 92-100 and accompany-
ing text (examining Citizens for Life's differentiation between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations).
162. 494 U.S. 652, 662-65 (1990); see also supra notes 101-108 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Courtfs reasoning in Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce).
163. See Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 259.
164. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2322.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text (noting that restric-
tions on political party speech have substantial effects on a party's ability to
engage in free political expression).
168. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 289 (1976) (per curiam) (finding a
narrowly tailored restriction on campaign contributions constitutional because
of its minimal impact on the freedom of independent political expression); see




and effective."169 Restricting the amount a political party may
spend on a candidate necessarily impedes a party's ability to
promote its candidates and its message. FECA has a "stifling
effect on the ability [of a political party to] do what it exists to
do."170 Political parties unite a myriad of interests and strive to
get out political messages that obtain broad-based support. 71
Hence, Justice Kennedy correctly determined that constraining
a political party's ability to speak prevents a political party
from "pursuing its most basic goals."172 This is hardly a mar-
ginal restriction.
2. Justice Kennedy Failed to Complete the First Amendment
Analysis
Despite Justice Kennedy's thorough analysis of the effect
of the restriction on political parties, he failed to address
whether the government's interest could justify the restric-
tion.173 He did not acknowledge that a restriction on speech
fails only if the government cannot support the restriction with
a compelling interest. 4 Even though the extent of the speech
restriction's effect is often the most contentious issue, the First
Amendment demands that the Court evaluate the govern-
ment's interest.1 75 Admittedly, the government may not be able
to justify its corruption interest when political parties are at
issue.1 76 Nonetheless, to establish precedent, courts should at
least assess the government interest.
3. The Ramifications of Justice Kennedy's Analysis
Justice Kennedy's ultimate conclusion that restrictions on
a political party's ability to make independent expenditures
169. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2322.
170. Id. at 2323. While restrictions on PACs may also infringe on a PAC's
ability to participate in the political process, PACs serve a different purpose in
American politics. Whereas PACs are exclusive organizations, representing
limited groups with narrow interests, political parties are inclusive organiza-
tions that strive to unite a multitude of interests and address a vast number
of issues. BIBBY, supra note 85, at 14-16.
171. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2323.
172. Id. at 2223.
173. Id. at 2321-23.
174. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
175. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (listing the First
Amendment's requirements).
176. See supra note 98 (noting that the corruption concerns espoused in
Buckley are generally not present with regard to political parties).
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were unconstitutional 17 implied that parties and their candi-
dates were distinct entities. If political parties and their can-
didates were considered one entity, it would be logically im-
possible for parties to make expenditures independent of their
candidates. Justice Kennedy noted, however, that during an
election, "[p]arty spending.., is indistinguishable in substance
from expenditures by the candidate."78 Although this asser-
tion may appear contradictory, it can be viewed as a continua-
tion of the Court's recent methodology in Citizens for Life7 9
and Michigan Chamber of Commerce.80 Justice Kennedy's
opinion noted that during elections, parties and their candi-
dates are virtually identical because they "are engaging in joint
First Amendment activity [and] have a practical identity of in-
terest."18' By looking to the reality of political campaigns
rather than resorting to categories, Justice Kennedy incorpo-
rated a contextual approach to campaign finance legislation
better suited to assess the real problems campaign finance
legislation addresses.
C. FUTURE COURTS SHOULD ADOPT JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
1. A Contextual Analysis Comports with Recent Supreme
Court Precedent
Beginning in 1986, the Supreme Court altered its approach
to evaluating campaign finance cases, indicating a retreat from
its rigid, categorical system of analysis. In Citizens For Life, the
Court did not automatically resort to Buckley's per se rules gov-
erning campaign finance legislation; 182 it conducted an inde-
pendent examination of the government's interest and the sever-
ity of the speech restriction on the individual corporation.'8 3 By
177. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Kennedy's finding that the magnitude of the speech restriction could not be
justified under the First Amendment).
178. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2323. Justice Kennedy's concluding paragraph
appears to question whether independent expenditures are possible during an
election.
179. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
180. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
181. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2223.
182. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (noting that the Court's
method of evaluation evolved from the per se approach in Right to Work
Committee to a more in-depth approach in Citizens for Life).
183. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the govern-
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assessing the characteristics of the regulated nonprofit corpo-
ration rather than just placing the corporation into a Buckley
organization category and the regulation into an expenditure
restriction category, the Court focused on the restriction's ac-
tual impact on a nonprofit corporation's ability to engage in
political speech to determine the provision's constitutional-
ity.8 4 This reasoned analysis enabled the Court to uphold the
restriction generally and protect the entity's First Amendment
rights.1 85
In Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court again em-
ployed a practical analysis 186 and did not resort to the Buck-
ley/Bellotti categorical approach to resolve questions about cor-
porate speech in the political process. 7 Instead, the Court
examined the actual function and effect of corporate speech in
the American electoral process, and properly found that the
government had a compelling interest in protecting the indi-
vidual voter from marginalization by preventing corporations
from distorting the political process. 8 Using a contextual ap-
proach, the Court again upheld legislative campaign finance
reform while adequately examining the First Amendment in-
terests.189
2. Reexamining Past Supreme Court Decisions Using a
Contextual Analysis
From its inception, many scholars and practitioners criti-
cized Buckley for dismantling FECA by inventing a categorical
framework couched in fine-line distinctions that failed to ac-
count for the realities and diversity of the American election
ment's interest and the effect of the speech restriction on the nonprofit corpo-
ration).
184. See Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254 (1986) (holding that the re-
strictions might operate to inhibit a nonprofit corporation from engaging in
political activity).
185. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (noting that the Court
in Citizens for Life upheld the restriction, but found it unconstitutional as
applied to an issue-oriented nonprofit corporation).
186. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's analysis in Michigan Chamber of Commerce).
187. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing Bellotti).
188. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text (discussing the
Michigan Chamber of Commerce Court's expanded definition of political cor-
ruption).
189. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 662-65
(1990) (discussing the Court's holding).
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system. 9 The remaining FECA provisions forced Congress to
adopt a piecemeal approach to campaign finance reform and
dramatically altered the American electoral system. After
Buckley, the Supreme Court adhered to its categorical ap-
proach to review campaign finance legislation, severely curtail-
ing legislative attempts to regulate campaign financing. 9' The
Court, using Justice Kennedy's superior contextual approach,
could have upheld campaign spending limits, 9 2 restrictions on
corporate speech in noncandidate elections, 93 and restrictions
on PAC spending without sacrificing the First Amendment. 94
a. Buckley Transformed FECA
Buckley held that the First Amendment permitted limita-
tions on contributions but not expenditures, resulting in asym-
metrical regulation of campaign financing.' 95 Thus, while PACs
and individuals are limited in the amount of money they may
contribute to political campaigns, campaigns themselves may
spend unlimited sums. 96 Under a contextual analysis, a court
would have examined the negative impact unlimited campaign
spending has on the electoral system. With no upper limit on
campaign spending, the cost of elections has increased dra-
matically, driving candidates to continually solicit contribu-
tions from special interests.' 97 Despite the appeal of encourag-
ing candidates to maintain a broad base of support, the reality
is that candidates, once elected, must devote considerable time
to fundraising, thereby neglecting their responsibility to indi-
vidual constituents. Instead of empowering voters by making
190. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing the general
discontent with the Buckley decision). As one prominent legal scholar noted,
the Buckley Court "treated the first amendment as a near-absolute in the
sphere of political debate" without importing "the realities of political cam-
paigns" into the analysis. Wright, supra note 56, at 611-12.
191. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
post-Buckley approach to campaign finance reform).
192. See supra notes 51, 57 (discussing Buckley's effect on campaign costs).
193. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (explaining Bellotti and
Citizens Against Rent Control).
194. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (describing National
Conservative PAC).
195. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1976) (per curiam) (noting
that Congress can only regulate contributions and not expenditures).
196. See supra notes 44, 51-57 and accompanying text (noting that Con-
gress cannot limit the total amount spent on an election).
197. See supra note 13 (describing the enormous sums of money raised
during the 1996 elections, most of which came from PACs).
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politicians accountable, the Buckley decision displaced the im-
portance of individual votes and made campaign findraising a
predominant concern for politicians. When unlimited sums en-
ter the political sphere, voters believe elections are determined
by money, not voters.19 Such public sentiment jeopardizes "the
integrity of our electoral process and the essence of our politi-
cal faith."'99 Thus, using a contextual approach, a court could
have found that a reasonable legislative ceiling on campaign
spending would be a proper means for rectifying the serious
problems associated with excessive campaign costs, and would
be justified by the government's interest in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the American electoral process.
b. Courts Should Evaluate the Corporate Impact in
Noncandidate Elections
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court found that in noncandidate
elections, voters have a right to hear corporate speech because
it provides information. 0 Discounting the dangers inherent in
corporate speech, the Court again ignored political reality.
Using a contextual approach, a court would have examined the
actual role of corporate speech in noncandidate elections. Cor-
porations spend enormous amounts of money on noncandidate
media campaigns that disproportionately impact voter choice
and election outcome.2"' Instead of contributing to the political
debate and assisting voter literacy, corporations dominate
communication and drown out other speakers.0 2 Thus, the
Court could find that the potential domination of the corporate
form warranted different treatment to protect First Amend-
ment principles, because the competition of ideas cannot coex-
ist in a system where corporations overwhelm the modes of
communication.
The Bellotti Court's declaration that corporate spending in
noncandidate elections did not present a corruption problem
198. See supra note 57 (describing the relationship between voter discon-
tent and large sums of campaign money).
199. Wright, supra note 56, at 624.
200. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (noting that
corporate speech has independent value in that it provides the public with in-
formation).
201 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing the docu-
mented cases of undue corporate influence in noncandidate elections that
amount to corruption of the political system).




was an uninformed assertion, because the public can perceive
massive corporate spending in a referenda election as a cor-
rupting influence.20 3  In referenda elections where corporate
spending is disproportionate to that of other speakers, corpo-
rations generally are successful in influencing the election.2°
When corporations dominate a campaign, individuals may be
squeezed out of the political process.0 5 Under a contextual
analysis, a court would assess real empirical evidence about
the corporate impact in noncandidate elections.2°6  A court
could then conclude that the government had a compelling in-
terest in preserving the integrity of the electoral system by
preventing corporations from overwhelming the medians of
communication and snuffing out individual voters.207
c. A Contextual Analysis Equates PACs with Corporations,
Not Individuals
In National Conservative PAC, the Supreme Court miscon-
strued the actual role of PACs in American elections and held
that PACs were not entitled to different treatment under the
First Amendment than individuals 2°8 because PACs represent
individual voters. 2 9 Instead of clinging to idealized notions of
203. See supra notes 57, 72 (discussing the relationship between voter dis-
content and excessive campaign spending).
204. See supra notes 72-73, 80 (discussing instances when corporations
dominate the political process in noncandidate elections).
205. See supra note 72 (discussing the negative impacts of corporate
speech on voter confidence and participation in popular elections).
206. Cf Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
307 n.2 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (reviewing evidence of corporate influ-
ence in California).
207. For most of this century, the Court accepted regulation of corpora-
tions because corporations could unduly influence the political system. Until
Bellotti, the Court weighed the possibility of the substantial negative effects of
corporate speech against the corporations' First Amendment rights. See su-
pra note 72 (noting the Court's prior treatment of corporate political speech).
208. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480,494-96 (1985) (contending
that PACs deserve full First Amendment protection).
209. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (noting that PACs are
entitled to full First Amendment protection). By equating PACs with indi-
viduals, the Court mechanically applied the Buckley rule that independent
expenditure restrictions are per se unconstitutional. See supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's determination that independ-
ent expenditure restrictions are unconstitutional). Had the Court equated
PACs with corporations rather than automatically finding the independent
expenditure an unconstitutional restriction, the Court could have balanced
the restriction against the government's corporate corruption interest. Such
an analysis would reflect the reality that most PACs function more like corpo-
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PACs, a court using a contextual approach would look at the
true function and structure of modern PACs in American elec-
tions. Most PACs are highly organized, bureaucratic institu-
tions representing business and corporate interests, not grass
root organizations representing the general populace. 210 Addi-
tionally, a PAC's leadership controls its money and is its voice,
not the individual donor.21 1 With campaign costs skyrocketing,
candidates have found that appeals to PACs are the most effi-
cient fundraising technique.2 2 As a result, individual voters
have become marginalized and the growth of special interest
PACs has exploded, dominating the political process.213 Thus,
a court using a contextual analysis could find that PAC struc-
tures more closely resemble corporations than individuals, and
that PAC domination resulting in voter marginalization justi-
fies congressional attempts to regulate PAC spending, just as
corporate domination justifies the same restrictions.
If a "traditional, grass roots" PAC challenged congressional
legislation, a court could still uphold the legislation against a
facial challenge and examine the particular PAC characteris-
tics to see if the legislation was constitutional as applied. This
is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Citizens for Life.214
The contextual approach imports flexibility into First Amend-
ment analysis that allows courts to protect an individual en-
tity's First Amendment rights while generally upholding cam-
paign finance legislation. At the same time, this approach
allows courts to narrowly tailor decisions based on the differ-
rations than individuals or candidates, while allowing the Court to evaluate
the restriction's justification. See supra notes 85, 87 (discussing PACs).
210. See supra note 87 (describing the function and structure of modern
PACs).
211. Under Buckley, Congress can restrict contributions. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976) (per curiam). Contributions are considered an indi-
rect communication because the contributor does not have direct control over
the speech. Id. at 20. The same can be said of modem PACs, as the leader-
ship is in control, not the individual donor. Mulligan, supra note 41, at 765-
66.
212. Under FECA, PACs may contribute five times the amount of indi-
viduals. See supra notes 25-26 (noting that while an individual can contribute
$1,000 to a particular candidate, a PAC's limit is $5,000 per candidate).
213. See supra notes 85, 87 (noting that most PACs represent corporate
interests).
214. See Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-63 (1986) (upholding a restric-
tion on corporations, but finding the restriction unconstitutional as applied to
a nonprofit ideological corporation). Treating PACs like corporations would
also alleviate the problem of corporations and labor unions circumventing the




ences in organizations and elections without resorting to the
all-inclusive categorical approach formulated in Buckley.
3. A Contextual Approach Comports with Congressional
Reform Efforts
Congress enacted FECA in an attempt to implement prac-
tical solutions to a campaign finance system riddled with cor-
ruption.215 FECA provisions aimed to empower individual vot-
ers while simultaneously decreasing candidate dependence on
large individual contributions.216 While the Supreme Court's
categorical decision in Buckley stymied congressional reform
efforts, the decisions following Buckley further removed judi-
cial opinions from the reality of political campaigns.217 Evalu-
ating campaign finance legislation using a contextual approach
ensures that courts employ an analysis best suited for dealing
with campaign finance reform. This analysis allows courts to
evaluate empirical evidence to determine if a problem creates a
compelling state interest. The courts could then assess
whether the legislation was narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. Under a contextual analysis, a court would not aban-
don First Amendment values. Instead, a court would recognize
that a government interest may be so strong that it outweighs
laissez-faire notions about the First Amendment. It also al-
lows the courts needed flexibility to distinguish between vari-
ous subsets of corporations and PACs, rather than stereotyping
all such groups in a single category, thereby giving a true look
at the impact of a campaign finance restriction on an individ-
ual or group.
D. CRFCC UNDER A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
A contextual analysis also addresses Justice Kennedy's as-
sertion in CRFCC that during elections, political parties and
candidates are essentially indistinguishable.1 8 Thus, the
215. See supra note 23 (discussing the need for reforms of the campaign
finance system that were exposed by the Watergate scandal).
216. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (noting that FECA was
an attempt to curb campaign finance abuses by decreasing candidate depend-
ence on large sums of money and equalizing the relative power of the individ-
ual voter).
217. See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court cases that followed Buckley).
218. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2323 (1996) (discussing Justice Kennedy's argument
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question remains whether, during an election, a party is even
capable of making independent expenditures. Often, the party
and the candidate will consult the same political analyst and
strategist, allowing the party to discover the candidate's cam-
paign strategy. 19 Additionally, even if parties and their candi-
date do not engage in any direct consulting, the party will do all
that it can to assist the candidate's strategy." ° The Court's as-
sertion in Buckley that those making independent expenditures
could intentionally hurt a candidate by failing to coordinate
strategy is inapplicable to political parties who depend heavily
on candidates.' 2 While it may be possible in theory, current
campaign behavior suggests it is unlikely that political parties
engage in truly independent expenditures during campaigns.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission
found the independent expenditure restriction on political par-
ties an unconstitutional abridgment of First Amendment rights.
The plurality opinions indicate, however, that the Court is split
on the appropriate doctrinal analysis. Justice Breyer advo-
cated a return to Buckley's categorical- evaluation of campaign
finance legislation. Once he labeled the legislation a restric-
tion on expenditures, he found the law unconstitutional. Jus-
tice Kennedy embraced a contextual approach that thoroughly
examined the specific nature of political parties and their
speech in candidate elections.
Since both opinions received identical support, the Court
left lower courts and Congress without any clear guidance for
balancing campaign finance reform laws against First Amend-
ment principles. This Comment therefore argues that courts
should adopt Justice Kennedy's contextual approach to evalu-
ate campaign finance laws. This approach builds on the
Court's recent trend of examining political realities. It also re-
flects the myriad of differences in various political and non-
that political parties are essentially the same as their candidates during an
election).
219. See supra note 57 (describing the indirect methods a party can use to
discover a candidate's strategy).
220. This is likely to occur because political parties are dependent on can-
didates during elections. CRFCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2322; see also supra note 57
(discussing indirect campaign assistance).
22L See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text (noting the important
relationship between political parties and their candidates).
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political organizations. Most importantly, a contextual analy-
sis enables courts to narrowly tailor decisions based on politi-
cal realities, thus facilitating congressional efforts to enact
campaign finance reform without degrading the value and im-
portance of the First Amendment. Such accommodation is vi-
tal to secure the integrity of the electoral process and to con-
vince disenfranchised voters that they are as important to the
political system as big-money corporations and PACs.
